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TAX COMMENT
mailed December 31, 1923, and was not received until January,
1924. The Court found,1 7 "the corporation did not have sufficient
funds in its general checking account to pay the dividends on December 31, 1923" and because of that fact held that the dividend was
income to petitioner in 1924.
In the Shearman case,' 8 the Court attempts to reconcile its
decision therein rendered with the decision in the case of Confmissioner v. Adams.' 9 In the Adams case, a resolution declared a dividend payable by checks, to be mailed on December 31st, on which day
funds were available. The checks were received the following year
and the income was held to be taxable in the following year. The
Court, in its labored attempt to distinguish the Shearman case from
the Adams case, declared, 20 "perhaps that case [Adams case] differs
from this [Shearman case] in that the taxpayer was there entitled to
receive the dividends only at such time as checks mailed were delivered." (In the Shearman case) "the time in which the taxpayer was
entitled to receive the dividends was definitely fixed by resolution
to be within the preceding year." This appears to be a futile attempt
to distinguish the facts in two cases, between which we can find no
difference. The Court, in the light of the Bingham decision, 2 1 should
have regarded the holding of the Adams case as being erroneous,
instead of drawing a distinction without a difference. It would seem
that the decision in the Shearnman case is sound, but the analysis of
the precedents and the theory underlying the decision apparently was
not clearly understood by the Court.
SEYMOUR SALS.

FEDERAL TAXATION OF STATE INSTRUMENTALITIES-CoNSTITU-

LAw.-The University of Illinois, an institution of higher
learninj maintained by the state of Illinois, imported certain laboratory equipment. Duties were levied under the appropriate paragraph
of the Tariff Act of 1922 and were paid under protest. The university brought suit to recover them, claiming that, as an instrumentality
of the state government, it was exempt from federal taxation. On
appeal from decisions 1 affirming the action of the collector, held,
affirmed. Customs duties may be levied under the power of Congress
to regulate foreign commerce, and the fact that they are incidentally
taxes will not render the levy invalid. Board of Trustees of tle
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University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U. S. -, 54 Sup. Ct.
443 (1933).
The preamble to the Tariff Act recites that it is enacted, among
other purposes, to regulate commerce with foreign nations. 2 The
power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce is exclusive.3 The
fact that the taxing power is used in such regulation does not invalidate the levy of the duties, for the laying of duties "is a common
means of executing the power." 4 The revenue thereby secured is
only "an incident to such an exercise of the power. It flows from
but does not create such power." 5 The Court refuses to attempt to
allocate some of the duties to an exercise of the power to regulate
foreign commerce and others to the power to tax.6
It was early settled that, as a necessary implication from the
nature of our government, the states and their governmental agencies
should be free from federal taxation and vice versa.7 More recent
decisions have been concerned with the question whether, in a given
instance, the state was performing a governmental, as distinguished
from a proprietary, function.8 In the instant case, the Court refrains
from deciding whether the maintenance of a state university is a
governmental function.9 It simply holds that regardless of whether
or not it is a state governmental instrumentality, it shall be required
to pay customs duties. This decision indicates a departure from the
general rule in so far as customs duties are concerned. Doubtless,
the Court was influenced by the fact that the argument that the state
governments were likely to be destroyed by the tax was scarcely
plausible since this was the first time that the legality of such a levy
was questioned. Furthermore, the free entry of merchandise
imported by states an& political subdivisions thereof would seriously
decrease the revenue from customs duties; therefore, the Court leaves
to Congress the extent, if any, to which such agencies may be relieved
from the payment of duties.
J. . M.
242 STAT. 858 (1922) : "An act to provide revenue, to regulate commerce
with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the United States and for
other purposes." (Italics ours.)
' CONSTITUTION, Art. 1, §8, ci. 3; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 193
(U. S. 1824); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349 (1904).
" STORY, THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed.) §1088.
rIbid.
' "Where * * ' there is a profession of exercising two express powers, the
exercise is supported if it can be brought under one." (1933) 33 COL. L. REV.
914, a discussion of the instant case.
'Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870); McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
'Note (1932) 7 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 143.
'(1929) 27 MIcH. L. REv. 499.

